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I.  AN OVERVIEW OF TEACHING SOCIOECONOMICS 
George Stigler’s memoir referred to economics as the “Imperial 
Science” because economists had colonized so many of the social 
sciences and, in his view, done by far the best work in a wide range of 
fields.1  Indeed, he felt that economics was the only social science worthy of 
the name “science.”2  Stigler’s Imperium was unremittingly hostile to 
government intervention in the markets. 
Socioeconomics takes the opposite perspective.  It sees economics 
as a coequal branch of the social sciences and believes that other social 
sciences can make substantial contributions to economic theory.  
Socioeconomics emphasizes that some forms of governmental involvement 
are essential to the creation of the institutions that permit the effective 
and fair functioning of most commercial transactions.  Socioeconomics 
also recognizes, however, that the governmental involvement can be 
harmful. 
Stigler wrote at a time that the Imperium was in its ascendancy.  Now, 
it is in crisis because neoclassical economic predictions have failed in so 
many critical applications.  Simultaneously, socioeconomics is surging.  
Recent Nobel Prizes in economics have gone to behavioral and institutional 
economists that demonstrated that socioeconomic approaches are essential 
to understand and predict economic relationships.3 
Unfortunately, most law and economics texts were written, and many 
law and economics scholars were educated, at a time when the Imperial 
Science was conquering the world and continue to teach propositions 
that have been falsified—sometimes decades ago.  The Imperium continues 
to strike back.  Socioeconomic scholars in law schools face the challenge 
of how to teach the new findings that have revolutionized the study of 
economics and led to dramatically different recommendations for law 
and public policy. 
I make three points in this Article.  First, it is valuable for law students 
 
 1. GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 191 (1988). 
 2. See id. at 87 (“[C]riticism of economics is the chief bond joining the other social sciences.  How much sweeter is envy than pity.”); id. at 115 (“Of all the social scientists, only economists possess a theoretical system to explain social behavior . . . .”). 
 3. See infra note 6. 
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to learn about economics.  Second, done properly, socioeconomics is good, 
indeed superior, economics.  This is a mainstream economics view.  For 
example, behavioral and institutional economics are not heterodox 
among professional economists.  I illustrate this point by explaining how 
I teach about the inadequacy of the prevailing law and economics theory 
of corporate governance.  Third, socioeconomics is superior economics 
because it has superior predictive power.  With these propositions in 
mind, I discuss teaching strategies I employ in the setting of a public 
policy school that may be of interest to law professors. 
A.  Economics Is Useful to Law Students 
Public policy schools uniformly recognize that it is essential that their 
graduates be economically literate.  As teachers of students who may 
one day represent clients and influence public policies, we hope first to 
give them “a seat at the table.”  If they are excluded from the key meetings 
at which policy is made their ability to influence policy will be limited.  
As a former regulator and lawyer, I know that one of the most common 
reasons that government lawyers get excluded from policy meetings is 
that the topics are perceived of as primarily economic and outside the 
ken of the lawyer’s expertise. 
The next step for us as educators is to help prepare the student to 
provide useful input at such meetings.  Most of this Article focuses on 
why a background in socioeconomics is an important part of that 
preparation.  Legal training should equip lawyers to evaluate the economic 
reasoning that animates most discussions of policy, to recognize the 
most common flaws, and to generate alternatives capable of advancing 
the client’s broader objectives.  Training in socioeconomics is critical to 
that preparation because it focuses on the weaknesses in traditional 
economics and provides a rich source of alternatives.  I found my economics 
background of extraordinary benefit to my career as a lawyer and 
savings and loan (S&L) regulator during the heart of the debacle, in my 
eventual return to school to study criminology, and as an academic. 
B.  Socioeconomics Is Useful Because, Done Properly,                                  
It Is Good Economics 
Law and economics should be taught because it is useful to 
practitioners.  A student who knows only about neoclassical economic 
principles that were outdated decades ago by findings in institutional or 
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behavioral economics (two subsets of socioeconomics)4 is a poorly 
educated student.  We can make graduates more effective lawyers by 
improving the quality of the economics taught in law school. 
Neoclassical economics is in crisis.  To its credit, it has been hoisted 
on its own elaborately constructed petard.  Neoclassical economic theory’s 
claim to legitimacy rests on predictive accuracy.5  That is exactly where 
it has failed.  Behavioral and institutional economics scholars have 
shown that their insights have improved predictive power in a wide 
range of microeconomic topics.  The improved explanatory power of 
behavioral and institutional economics is so well accepted today that 
they have been engrafted onto the neoclassical models, and the leaders in 
both of the most powerful currents of socioeconomics have received 
most of the Nobel Prizes in economics.6  Today, institutional and 
behavioral economics are not heterodox.  Instead, they are conventional. 
The absorption of socioeconomics into the conventional economics 
canon has helped obscure the predictive failures of neoclassical 
economics in a host of applications.  Today, however, the “exceptions” 
to neoclassical precepts that must be taught in a sophisticated economics 
class are so common and so important that the underlying neoclassical 
paradigm bears little relationship to modern economics. 
 
 4. Institutional economics draws primarily on anthropology, sociology, criminology, information and organization theory, and political science.  Behavioral economics draws primarily on psychology.  Both are quintessential “socio” economics in the sense that they draw on social science findings to inform our understanding of economics. 
 5. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953).  Friedman used “positive” in the title of this book to emphasize his view that economics should not be “normative.”  He argued that positive economics was scientific because it relied on predictive ability and testable hypotheses, not value judgments.  Id. at 3–7.  6. In 2002, the Nobel Prize went to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon L. Smith, a psychologist and an economist respectively, for their work in behavioral economics.  In 2001, the prize went to three institutional economists, George Akerlof, A. Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz.  In 1998, Amartya Sen, one of the world leaders in socioeconomics, received the prize.  In 1996, the prize was split between two institutional economists, James A. Mirrlees and William Vickrey.  Three game theorists, John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash, and Reinhard Selten, shared the prize in 1994.  Two law and history theorists, Robert W. Fogel and Douglass C. North, shared the prize in 1993.  Gary S. Becker, the most prolific of those interested in institutional economics, won the prize in 1992.  The leading “new” institutional theorist, Ronald H. Coase, won the prize in 1991.  James M. Buchanan won the prize in 1986 for his work in institutional economics, particularly public choice theory.  In 1982, George J. Stigler, a leading institutional theorist, won the prize.  In 1978, Herbert A. Simon won the prize for his work in institutional economics.  In 1974, as in 2002, the prize was split between scholars from polar ideological perspectives who had done noteworthy work in the related fields.  Gunnar Myrdal and Friedrich August von Hayek were the “odd couple.”  In 1972, Sir John R. Hicks and Kenneth J. Arrow, who shared an interest in the rationales for and efficacy of governmental program, split the prize.  The prize in economics was first awarded in 1969.  See The Official Web Site of the Nobel Foundation, List of All Laureates, at http://www.nobel.se/search/all_laureates_c.html (last modified Dec. 3, 2003). 
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In this Article, I discuss how I bring socioeconomics into my teaching 
about corporate governance, white-collar crime, and regulation.  I have 
chosen as my illustrative example my socioeconomic critique of the 
predictive strength of the leading law and economics model of corporate 
governance in the S&L debacle and the current financial scandals.  I 
show that its predictions failed uniformly and that its proponents did not 
acknowledge these failures or adjust the model to remedy the flaws.  I 
explain that its proponents are sanguine about the danger of fraud by 
controlling persons (“control fraud”) without any consideration of the 
white-collar criminology literature that takes the opposite view.  I note 
that the policy advice flowing from the model helped cause the ongoing 
financial scandals. 
I provide a sketch of the intellectual history of the field that I present 
to my students when I teach classes in microeconomics, public financial 
management, and regulation.  I find that students appreciate a map that 
explains the general outlines of the relationship between neoclassical 
and socioeconomics.  My sketch ends with another thing I explain when 
I teach microeconomics: the current crisis in microeconomic and finance 
theory brought on by its predictive failures exemplified by the twin 
Japanese bubbles, the U.S. high-tech bubble, and the ongoing wave of 
enormous control frauds. 
I also explain to students how the standard neoclassical model 
“proves” that employment discrimination could produce segregated 
workplaces but not discriminatory wages.7  I find this example particularly 
useful in starting class discussions.  The students realize that the claim is 
false and could lead to perverse policies, but they also come to see that 
neoclassical economics does support the conclusion.  They find that they 
have to consider other social sciences—sociology and political science, 
for example—to understand why what Becker termed a “taste” for 
discrimination could persist for over a century despite the fact that it was 
“inefficient” and why that “taste” could produce dramatically lower 
wages for black Americans.8 
 
 7. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971).  Becker applied microeconomic theory to explain employment discrimination.  His central argument was that discrimination could produce employment segregation if workers had a taste for discrimination, but it could not cause lower wages for blacks absent extraordinarily pervasive bigotry because firms that did not discriminate against blacks would gain a competitive advantage over firms that did. 
 8. See id. at 101–34. 
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1.  The Overall Difficulties with Conventional                                              
Law and Economics 
The central problem in teaching economics to law students is that, 
overwhelmingly, law and economics scholars tend not to know much 
about, or be sympathetic toward, socioeconomics.  My view is that 
socioeconomics, done properly, is good economics.  As such, it should 
be central to any law and economics class.  This is not because it is more 
“moral” than neoclassical microeconomics, or a better description of the 
real world, but because it has better predictive strength.  In a better 
world, the members of this section would be centrists within the law and 
economics section and this section would not exist. 
The reason this section does exist is that scholars who have a polar 
ideology (libertarian) to most socioeconomic scholars are seen as 
dominating law and economics.  This schism was not inevitable, and it is 
generally overstated.  Many of the earliest law and economics scholars 
were not, for example, hostile to regulation.  Now, however, business 
interests that are intensely hostile to regulation fund most law and 
economics endowments in academia and in foundations and actively 
seek to drive law and economics into a libertarian mode.  (These 
business interests had generally become enraged with the government 
after it found that they had violated laws or regulations, so their vitriol 
was rational.)9  The scholars who edit journals devoted to law and 
 
 9. For example, Washington Post staff writer Robert G. Kaiser reported, on May 3, 1999, about the leading funder of hard right causes, Richard Mellon Scaife.   Scaife had one last serious fling with electoral politics in 1972, when he gave 330 $3,000 checks—$990,000—to 330 different dummy organizations, all of them fronting for the Nixon campaign.  The Washington Post disclosed these contributions a fortnight before the election, and Scaife readily acknowledged them.  He wrote so many checks to avoid the federal gift tax then in force. Robert G. Kaiser, An Enigmatic Heir’s Paradoxical World, WASH. POST, May 3, 1999, at A1. The Olin Corporation is a chemical company that has run afoul of CERCLA and a host of environmental laws.  It was an important producer of DDT at the Redstone Arsenal (poisoning local waters and humans).  Olin sought to have CERCLA declared unconstitutional to escape liability for severe pollution.  The United States Court of Appeals reversed the lower court in United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997), noting the following: Olin has operated a chemical manufacturing facility in McIntosh, Alabama since 1951.  Until 1982, the plant produced mercury- and chlorine-based commercial chemicals that contaminated significant segments of Olin’s property.  This appeal involves one such portion of the site, called Operable Unit #1 (“OU-1”).  Groundwater and soil pollution at OU-1 make it unfit for future residential use. 
Id. at 1508. Koch Industries has an equally poor environmental record and has recently been found liable of filing false claims in a case that demonstrated widespread fraud.  See H. Josef Hebert, EPA Fines Pipeline Firm $35 Million, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 13, 2000), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/epa000113.html. 
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economics often share this hostility. 
One of the consequences of this hostility is that too few law and 
economics scholars emphasize the three major theoretical economic 
developments of the last two decades.  Those developments are the 
increasing maturity of institutional economics, the rise of behavioral 
economics, and the predictive failures of neoclassical economics. 
2.  Why Many Law and Economics Scholars                                         
Devalue Socioeconomics 
I believe that the explanation for the lack of emphasis by law and 
economics scholars about the failures of the libertarian neoclassical 
economic models and developments in institutional and behavioral 
economics has three parts.  First, most law and economics scholars are, 
like me, not professional economists.  They know less about the flaws in 
the neoclassical model than professional economists.  Second, they focus 
on other matters, and life is too short for noneconomists to try to keep up 
on all the advances in behavioral and institutional economics.  Third, 
much of what economists are discovering is contrary to libertarian law 
and economics scholars’ ideological interests, and, as behavioral economics 
teaches, cognitive dissonance is powerful.  Socioeconomics is most 
commonly associated with communitarians—the antithesis of libertarian 
thought. 
3.  The Centrality of Institutional Economics 
Institutional economics has a long pedigree.  Indeed, it was part of the 
classical and neoclassical models before it was ever given a name.10  The 
classical theorists, Adam Smith and Hobbes, worried about institutions 
and recognized that a rule of law, a police power, and an effective tort 
and contract system were essential to a well-functioning economy.11  
They recognized that the unseen hand needed a backbone to function, 
and that a legal system, police, and courts were all essential institutions 
to effective markets.  Smith warned that other institutions, for example, 
trade associations, were important and could lead to cartels.  Smith’s passion 
 
 10. See, e.g., GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONS 87–126 (1999) (linking modern institutional economics to a long tradition in economics). 
 11. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91–100 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (discussing natural law and contracts); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 862–63 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (discussing the importance of “a regular administration of justice”). 
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was pointing out the pernicious effects of anticompetitive institutions 
created by government to aid the rich and politically powerful.12  Smith 
identified what we would now term “agency” problems because of the 
separation between ownership and control in stock companies.  In short, 
institutional economics was present from the beginning of classical 
economics.13 
The development of institutional economics, of course, continues.  
The neoclassical microeconomics model is constantly modified in the 
journals to take into account institutional characteristics.  Neoclassical 
scholars have done much of the best work in institutional economics.  
The unsophisticated neoclassical response to why cartels are (purportedly) 
unimportant—they are doomed to fail because they encourage cheating 
by cartel members—relies on institutional and behavioral economic 
principles.14  The more sophisticated neoclassical response is that a cartel is 
a “repeated game” with no predictable Nash equilibrium because cartel 
punishment and social bonds can produce stable cartels.  Thus neoclassical 
debates often center on institutional considerations. 
Much of what is considered central to modern neoclassical economics 
is institutional economics.  Coase’s theory of the firm was a seminal 
work in institutional economics.  He presented the paradox of why an 
organization (the firm) so central to modern market economies existed at 
all and why it generally rejected relying on internal markets.15  The 
answer, implicitly, rested on behavioral and institutional economics.  
The Coase Theorem requires a focus on transactional costs and the 
enforceability of rights.16  Both of these factors depend on institutions.  
Stigler’s economic theory of regulation (“regulatory capture”) became a 
staple of institutional economics,17 and Buchanan’s public choice theory 
applied institutional economics to the government more broadly.18  
 
 12. See SMITH, supra note 11, at 420–65 (discussing protectionist trade restraint).  13. Smith also opined that humans consistently overstate their chances of winning a lottery—which means he also embraced at least part of what we now call behavioral economics.  14. Criminologists have used principles arising from psychology, anthropology, and sociology to explain why some cartels are extremely stable.  See generally Gilbert Geis, White Collar Crime: The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961, in CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY 139 (Marshall B. Clinard & Richard Quinney eds., 1967) (demonstrating how the electrical generator manufacturers developed internal cultures that produced a stable price-fixing cartel). 
 15. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33–55 (1988) (describing “the nature of the firm”). 
 16. See id. at 114–49 (discussing why assignment of legal rights through the judicial system is necessitated by the existence of transactional costs). 
 17. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 114–44 (1975) (arguing that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”). 
 18. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
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Becker’s classic articles on the family assume widespread altruism and 
discuss a broad range of behavioral characteristics and institutional 
arrangements.19  Hernando de Soto’s work on property rights and economic 
development states that the institutions societies use to define, allocate, 
and transfer rights to property are vitally important.20 
In short, I teach that sophisticated classical and neoclassical economists 
have long stressed that effective governmental institutions are essential 
for a market economy to perform well.  Classical economists did not see 
economics as an isolated field.  They often used the phrase “political 
economy” to describe their work.  They saw the field we now call 
economics as deeply intertwined with politics and philosophy. 
4.  The Rise of Behavioral Economics 
Behavioral economics poses a more central challenge to the neoclassical 
model.  It strikes at the core assumption that, in the economic sphere, 
individuals will act rationally.  Rationality is an enormously useful 
assumption because it makes many economic models determinative.  
Behavioral economics, however, can also offer clues as to how markets 
may work despite some kinds of irrationality.  Whether individuals are 
risk averse, risk neutral, or risk lovers is a matter of preference, not 
rationality.  Behavioral economics teaches that these preferences are not 
always stable.  Individuals may change their preferences as they age.  
They are frequently risk averse when the issue involves a large portion 
of their wealth but risk lovers when small amounts are involved (which 
helps explain the success of numbers, the lottery, and Las Vegas).  A 
subtle changing of the way a question is phrased, which does not change 
the distribution of risk and payoffs, can lead to very different risk 
preference results in studies.21 
 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1–9 (1965) (introducing their application of economic theory to nonmarket aspects of government). 
 19. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 ECON. J. 493, 512–16 (1965); Gary S. Becker, Family Economics and Macro Behavior, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1988); Gary S. Becker & Nigel Tomes, Human Capital and the Rise and Fall 
of Families, 4 J. LAB. ECON. S1, S4 (1986). 
 20. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 153–205 (2000) (arguing that when large segments of a society do not have access to the formal property law system, significant amounts of capital remain stagnant and useless).  21. HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 23–32 (2000) (discussing the effect of perceived risk on the behavior of individual investors). 
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Despite all these limitations, however, I teach students that these risk 
preferences are sufficiently stable that trillions of dollars of financial 
derivatives and trillions of dollars of instruments with embedded options 
(for example, the typical American home mortgage) trade every year.  
They trade on the basis of incredibly complex “option adjusted spread” 
(OAS) models that use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate values.  The 
most sophisticated market participants use supercomputers to produce 
these simulations, a daily mark-to-market, and a “value at risk” (VAR) 
study of risk exposure of the investment portfolio.  Behavioral economics is 
embedded in the Black-Scholes model used to estimate option values.22  
In sum, what we call neoclassical economics subsumes an enormous 
range of findings from institutional and behavioral economics. 
When derivative traders talk frankly about risk, they discuss institutional 
and behavioral characteristics.  Indeed, the failure of Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) (despite Robert Merton and Myron Scholes’s  
presence with the firm) is a testament to both of these characteristics.  
Institutional factors were critical to Russia’s default, and behavioral 
economics best explains the resultant “flight to quality” that meant that 
LTCM’s diversified portfolio was exposed to systemic risk.  LTCM 
essentially made the same bet a thousand times: that spreads would 
narrow.  In a flight to quality, spreads widen.  Behavioral economics 
also best explains the hubris that left LTCM undercapitalized, grossly 
leveraged, and overly sanguine about its risk exposure.  LTCM’s failure 
made the award of the Nobel Prize for economics to scholars who have 
expertise in behavioral economics certain.  If the two economists who 
received the 1997 Nobel Prize for economics for their work on the 
Black-Scholes model23 helped lead their company to disaster through a 
series of irrational decisions, then the behavioral economists had to be 
on to something very important. 
5.  The False Dichotomy Between Descriptive Accuracy                                  
and Predictive Strength 
I believe (and teach) that one of the most ill-conceived debates 
concerns the descriptive accuracy versus predictive strength debate.  
Predictive strength is rightly prized in a model.  Models must and should 
be reductionist to be usable.  A quantitative model with strong, robust 
predictive strength is a wonderful thing. 
There is, however, no logical basis for believing that assumptions that 
 
 22. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 638–42 (1973).  23. I tell students that the Nobel Prize winners exemplify a new psychiatric category—“savant-idiots.” 
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are strongly contrary to fact will predict more accurately than accurate 
assumptions.  Take the example that one of the economists who trained 
me used—the ideal gas laws that we all studied in chemistry or physics.  
The ideal gas laws make simplifying assumptions that are broadly, but 
not invariably, accurate.  My professor concluded that this analogy 
showed that descriptive accuracy was irrelevant.  I reached the opposite 
conclusion.  The ideal gas laws provide highly accurate results as long as 
the very unusual cases assumed away are not present.  The ideal gas 
laws provide inaccurate estimates in situations (extraordinarily high or 
low pressures) that are contrary to the simplifying assumption. 
Economists have always, implicitly, admitted that seriously counterfactual 
assumptions would produce erroneous predictions.  Classical scholars 
were largely concerned with monopoly.  They recognized that the 
competitive model could not be used to predict outcomes if there were, 
contrary to the standard assumption, one instead of many providers of a 
good or service.  Similarly, oligopoly and imperfect competition models 
were found necessary to deal with situations in which there were few 
providers and differentiated products. 
Many of the Nobel Prizes in economics have gone to scholars who 
asked what would happen to the predictions of the neoclassical model 
were more accurate assumptions to be made.  Stigler became famous for 
investigating what would happen if the cost of gaining information was 
considered.24  Akerlof’s prize came from considering the impact of 
erroneous information and the dynamic process that results when market 
participants consciously deceive.25  Both of these scholars’ insights are 
now fixtures of institutional economics, and Akerlof’s work is also 
central to behavioral economics.  Neoclassical economists now consider 
both of these findings to be part of their canon.  The study of barriers to 
entry spawned the dynamic view of market power.  Better assumptions 
have led to better predictive strength. 
C.  Teaching the Triumph and Tragedy of Neoclassical Economics 
I try to teach students about the triumph of neoclassical economics 
without foreshadowing the crisis.  I find that it makes a compelling story 
 
 24. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).  25. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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and keeps students’ attention.  I present the narrative as the successful 
struggle of the neoclassical model to overcome three challenges.  The 
first is the challenge of Marxist economics and the purported rapid 
growth of the Soviet Union and the expansion of communism.  The 
second challenge is one of universality.  The neoclassical model was 
found to be useful in a broad range of nations and to very different 
economies ranging from “primitive” to high-tech.  Japan’s economic 
miracle and a rival Japanese model of microeconomics (based on 
socioeconomics) pose the third challenge. 
Neoclassical microeconomics surmounts each of these increasingly 
difficult challenges with bravura.  The irony I am setting up, of course, is 
the ancient warning that those whom the gods wish to destroy they first 
make proud.  The standard neoclassical models produce their most 
abject failures at the very time that the models triumph.  My teaching 
emphasizes microeconomics because it is most relevant to the subjects I 
teach, such as finance, regulation, and white-collar crime.  I provide my 
students with the briefest of overviews of macroeconomics to show that 
the same irony of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory occurred in 
neoclassical macroeconomics.  I do not discuss the crisis in macroeconomics 
here because it is tangential to teaching law students. 
The proverbial bottom line that I leave students with is that both 
branches of “traditional” economics are in crisis.  I explain to students 
that while macroeconomics failed first, microeconomics’ crisis has been 
coming for a long time.  Microeconomics’ crisis was only widely recognized 
recently.  Both fields are in crisis because of their predictive failures.  I 
find that providing this background to students both intrigues them and 
makes them open to considering whether socioeconomics could inform 
our understanding of economics and public policy in areas as diverse as 
white-collar crime, discrimination, equality, regulation, finance, and 
politics.  However, I also use the story as a caution about socioeconomics.  
Japan’s microeconomic model was a form of socioeconomics, and it 
appears to have failed to overcome the universality challenge—it may 
have worked exceptionally well in the past, but it works very poorly 
now.  We all know how many embarrassingly poor theories have been 
developed by social scientists.  Socioeconomists will fall prey to similar 
gaffes.  
1.  Teaching the Triumph of Neoclassical                                               
Economics over Marxism 
The ultra-brief version of how I teach the response of neoclassical 
economics to the three great challenges is as follows.  The first challenge, 
Marxism, posed the least difficulty.  Neoclassical economists think that 
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Marx was wrong on the economics. 
The rapid economic development of Communist nations seemed to 
pose a more serious challenge to neoclassical economics.  There was 
some hand wringing when the USSR was reporting record growth and 
launching Sputnik, but economists were skeptical about the numbers.26  
Neoclassical economists had a relatively good track record in identifying 
the stultifying effect of communism on economic development and 
freedom. 
Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, libertarian economists 
believed that they had conquered the intellectual landscape and that 
success proved their unique merit.  The passages about the “Imperial 
Science” by Stigler that I quoted in the introduction capture the spirit of 
triumphalism in the late 1980s.27 
2.  Neoclassical Economics Establishes Its Universality 
Adam Smith developed his theories through the study of specific 
institutions and practices in Europe in general and England in particular.  
One of the obvious questions was whether his theories had general 
applicability to other cultures and to more modern economic forms.  Adolf 
Berle and Gardiner Means, for example, said that the development of the 
modern corporation as the dominant form of economic activity changed 
everything.  Means’s studies quantified the degree of separation between 
ownership and control in the typical corporation, and he and Berle 
opined that the separation led to widespread exploitation of shareholders by 
managers.28  Means also argued that prices were “administered” by 
large corporations, not set by markets. 
Much of the twentieth century was grim for neoclassical economics.  
Nations turned their back on free trade, which helped produce the Great 
Depression.  The Great Depression led to a great expansion of government 
activity and made leaders like President Roosevelt heroes to many 
 
 26. Ironically, it was neoclassical economists who developed economic theories explaining how an economy in which the state owned the means of production could be economically efficient.  The Communist states, however, for reasons that institutional economics could explain, never made effective use of shadow pricing.  Similarly, behavioral economists, from Adam Smith on, could have explained why state ownership would lead to a society in which, in the words of the old Soviet-era joke, “They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work.” 
 27. See supra notes 2–3.  28. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–25 (1940). 
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people.  Wars are fought by governments, and the triumph of the Allies 
increased their legitimacy and helped lead Americans and Europeans to 
look to their governments for solutions.  The success of the Marshall 
Plan and the fact that the United States did not return to depression after 
the war reinforced this favorable view of government.  The socialist 
Labor Party defeated Winston Churchill, Great Britain’s war hero. 
Libertarian neoclassical economists were in despair.  They met in 
small groups to try to derail the march down the “Road to Serfdom.”29  
Hayek railed that scientific socialism was seen as the wave of the future, 
and capitalism was considered an archaic, inhumane form of economics 
rightly discarded by all advanced thinkers.30  The dictum attributed to 
Margaret Mead, “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, 
committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it’s the only thing that 
ever has,” aptly describes the small group of libertarian neoclassical 
economists at the end of World War II.  It took them almost forty years 
of struggle to attain primacy.  The elections of Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan testified to the triumph of the neoclassical model over 
scientific socialism, state planning, and the welfare state. 
I find this part of the tale amazes most students.  Few of them are 
aware that there was a time when conservatives felt like an endangered 
species.  I intend it also as a message that small groups of people can 
prevail, but they need a coherent theory of change and commitment to 
the very long haul. 
3.  The Japanese Challenge to Neoclassical Economics 
The “twist” I present that students most appreciate in my sketch of the 
crisis in microeconomic theory is the case of Japan.  I explain that the 
real challenge to the neoclassical microeconomic model was not the 
USSR, but Japan.  Japan had pervasive government intervention in key 
markets.  Japan had a series of practices that seemed irrational under 
neoclassical microeconomic principles, such as lifetime employment (for 
males in larger firms), salary increases based on seniority, not productivity, 
and a “convoy” system in which the “main banks” organized a welter of 
cross subsidies and transactions within the keiretsu. 
Japan’s economic challenge to the neoclassical model had two related 
dimensions.  First, its performance was superb.  “Economic miracle” 
remains an apt name for Japan’s decades-long expansion. 
Second, Japan began to develop a Japanese theory of microeconomics 
and development.  This model rested on behavioral and institutional 
 
 29. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
 30. Id. at 10–23, 43–55. 
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economics.  It posited that lifetime employment meant that Japanese 
workers had no incentive to resist technological advances.  Japanese 
social cohesion and group orientation meant that there was labor 
involvement as well as labor peace and that cooperation prevailed over 
competition within the firm and the nation.  (Japan was the communitarian 
state.)  A “just in time inventory system” is ideal when there is labor 
peace, but it gives labor enormous leverage if there is discord.  Japanese 
patience and its long-run perspective were said to allow Japan to accept 
lower returns on investments, spurring greater economic growth.  Japan’s 
institutions were said to give it enormous advantages. 
Japanese institutions other than lifetime employment were also 
thought to be critical to its success.  Its ultra-competitive universities 
funneled the best and the brightest into jobs as bureaucrats.  Business 
and government were closely intertwined and cooperative.  The main 
banks were said to be far better judges of credit quality because their 
largest loans went to firms in which they had seats on the boards of 
directors.  Japanese leaders eagerly anticipated surpassing the United 
States as the world’s largest economy.  They wanted the political 
independence that would come with their new status.  A famous book’s 
title, The Japan That Can Say No, captured the sentiment.31 
Japan was also proving influential.  A host of Asian states emulated its 
policies—and they produced their own mini miracles.  They shared 
cultures that put less stress on the individual, and they all employed a 
substantial government role in economic development.  Neoclassical 
economics was at a loss to explain Japan’s success.  The standard model 
implied that Japan’s anticompetitive practices should be disastrous. 
In sum, Japan posed a different form of theoretical challenge to the 
universality of the neoclassical model.  Perhaps it only worked best in 
Western cultures that emphasized individualism.  Indeed, perhaps a very 
different economic model could be far superior to the neoclassical model 
if a society were arranged along Confucian lines. 
Few things were sweeter to neoclassical economists than the piercing 
of the twin Japanese bubbles, the subsequent crisis throughout the Asian 
nations that copied its policies, and, most delicious of all, the reaction of 
Japan’s economists to the rolling recessions that have now stretched over 
a dozen years.  Japanese economists decided that the answer was to 
 
 31. SHINTARO ISHIHARA, THE JAPAN THAT CAN SAY NO (Frank Baldwin trans., 1991). 
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adopt U.S. policies.  Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.  The 
predictive power of the neoclassical microeconomic model seemed to be 
proved. 
I explain to students that the fall of Suharto was the high-water mark 
for neoclassical microeconomics.  The markets deposed a notoriously 
corrupt (nearly) absolute leader.  The markets were doing something that 
Indonesia desperately needed yet had been unable to achieve for 
decades.  And the markets did it peacefully despite Suharto’s best efforts 
to lie, cheat, obfuscate, and threaten.  The market trumped politics as a 
reformer. 
4.  The Rise of the “Hyperpower” 
All of this happened as the United States emerged from economic 
plodding and began to grow faster than virtually any developed nation 
during much of the 1990s.  Meanwhile, U.S. military power became 
transcendent.  The French now refer to the United States as the “hyperpower.”  
The stock market went into the greatest U.S. bull market of modern 
times.  America was the leader in the “new economy” and the leader in 
“venture capital.”  It seemed poised to widen its lead.  The United States 
was the supercharged engine that pulled the world economy forward 
during the 1990s—with no help from Japan, little help from Germany 
and France, and little help from the former Asian tigers.  U.S. inflation 
was minimal, employment reached record levels, poverty declined, and 
the federal budget reached unprecedented surpluses.  Delegations from 
all over the world visited the United States to learn how to manage. 
5.  The One-Two Punch KOs the Neoclassical Model at                                   
Its Moment of Triumph 
Students appreciate the irony that while Soviet economics never posed 
a serious challenge to the neoclassical microeconomic model, the fall of 
the Soviet system did.  Hundreds of Western economists became consultants 
to the former Soviet states.  The results were humbling and revealing.  
Things went very badly, and institutional and behavioral factors became 
all the rage in discussing the problems of post-Soviet development.  A 
drive for “transparency” and “accountable” institutions was now perceived 
of as the prerequisite for economic development.  Scholars from a broad 
range of fields began to stress “trust” as central to economic, political, 
and social development. 
The collapse of the Soviet system dealt out an even more embarrassing 
lesson in the dangers of hubris to economists.  The August 17, 1998 
Russian debt default brought down LTCM and humbled the Nobel Prize 
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winners who shaped modern finance.  They did not know how to fix 
Russia’s economy, and they did not understand its weaknesses.  (The 
latter helps explain the former.) 
The final irony is that the boom of the 1990s that seemed to represent 
the triumph of neoclassical economics transformed into its greatest 
failure when the boom was revealed to be a bubble.  The bursting of the 
high-tech bubble in U.S. stocks in early 2000 and the wave of scandals 
caused by the failure-of-control frauds like Enron in late 2001 followed 
quickly on the heels of the late 1998 failure of LTCM.  The central 
principle of modern finance theory (which is applied microeconomics) is 
the “efficient markets” hypothesis, which predicts that markets lack any 
systematic bias and move toward prices that reflect real economic 
values.  The NASDAQ and the NIKKEI have both lost roughly seventy-
five percent of their market value from their highs during their respective 
bubbles.  This suggests that markets can be massively inefficient and 
move steadily away from prices that reflect real economic values for 
many years.  Microeconomics is often defined as the study of the price 
system, so a massive flaw in pricing goes to the heart of the neoclassical 
model.  I will explain why this has particular relevance for teaching 
corporate governance, white-collar crime, and control fraud theory. 
II.  TEACHING SOCIOECONOMICS IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT 
Several of the classes I teach discuss the necessity of using socioeconomic 
principles to make sense of the $7 trillion loss in U.S. stock market 
capitalization.  I have chosen two aspects of what I teach to illustrate the 
approach I use. 
The first is the S&L debacle of the 1980s that dealt painful lessons that 
could have helped us avoid the current scandals.  I explain why the 
conventional economic wisdom about the debacle was almost entirely in 
error and led to poor public policy choices that left us condemned to 
repeat the misfortune.  The second is a discussion of how I use 
socioeconomics to explain one facet of the current scandals—the failure of 
corporate governance and market mechanisms to prevent control frauds. 
A.   Misinterpreted Warnings: The Savings and Loan Debacle 
There was a major warning sign that the libertarian wing of 
neoclassical microeconomics was exposing the United States to severe 
problems well before the recent worldwide collapse of the high-tech 
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bubbles.  The S&L debacle cost the taxpayers $150 billion (present 
valued in 1993).  The debacle had two stages.  The interest rate risk 
phase ran from 1979 to 1982.  The fraud and credit risk phase occurred 
from 1983 to 1989.  The first phase was, in great part, the result of very 
bad regulation, and economists (and regulators, and the industry, and 
key members of Congress) warned in advance that the rules were 
exposing the industry to systemic risk.  There is broad agreement on the 
first phase of the debacle, so I use it primarily to explain the concept of 
interest rate risk and to discuss why public choice and regulatory capture 
theory are (inadequate) explanations for why the known risk was not 
addressed. 
I teach that the second phase of the debacle was the result of even 
worse deregulation and desupervision.  Economists designed and implemented 
the policies despite the fact that economic theory unambiguously 
predicted that they would be disastrous.  They did not warn anyone that 
the policies were dangerous.  They led the fight to retain the policies 
even as the policies proved calamitous.  After the debacle, they created a 
conventional economic wisdom that is false and absolves deregulation 
and desupervision of blame.  They then recommended policies that set 
the stage for the ongoing financial scandals. 
In very brief form, here is what I present.  President Reagan appointed 
Dick Pratt, an academic expert in finance, chairman of the S&L 
regulatory agency (the Bank Board).  Pratt, together with economists at 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Treasury 
Department, drafted the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 that (moderately) 
deregulated federally chartered S&Ls.32  The model for the bill was 
Texas’s earlier S&L deregulation. 
Economic theory predicted that such a move would cause state 
legislators and regulators to deregulate even more.  This was known as 
the “competition in laxity.”  Despite its revealing, pejorative name, 
economists favored this competitive dynamic because it led to ever-
weaker regulation.  Regulation was, of course, bad.  Laxity, therefore, 
was good.  California immediately “saw” the federal deregulatory bet 
and “raised” it by totally deregulating permissible investments. 
Pratt, Reagan, and the OMB then added three elements to the mix.  
They desupervised, cutting the number of examiners and gutting key 
prudential standards.  They tortured regulatory accounting principles to 
create what the financial world aptly referred to as creative regulatory 
accounting principles.  This was designed to cover up the mass insolvency 
of the industry and avoid recognizing that the budget deficit was $150 
 
 32. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1496 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
BLACK.DOC 9/17/2019  4:54 PM 
[VOL. 41:  231, 2004]  The Imperium Strikes Back 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 249 
billion larger than reported.  They also removed limitations that prevented a 
single owner from dominating a S&L and encouraged new entries, even 
by real estate developers with clear conflicts of interest. 
To sum it up, at a time of mass insolvency (which maximizes moral 
hazard), in an industry with deposit insurance (which eviscerates private 
market discipline), Pratt took a series of actions that were certain to 
maximize the perverse incentives for fraud by controlling persons 
(control fraud).  Economic theory, and experience, has long taught that 
this combination will produce a disaster. 
Pratt and the administration economists, nevertheless, followed this 
recipe for catastrophe and did not warn Congress of the risks.  No 
economist warned contemporaneously of the risk.  As the economist 
Larry White admitted ruefully years later, there were “no Cassandras.”33 
Pratt’s successor, Ed Gray, was a Reaganite with little understanding 
of economics.  He had a “road to Damascus” experience after he realized 
from a series of briefings that the worst S&L failures overwhelmingly 
followed the same pattern: They were control frauds dominated by 
former real estate developers.  Gray became the great “reregulator.”  
This made him anathema within the administration.  It first tried to force 
him to resign.  When that effort failed, the administration tried to give 
Charles Keating majority control of the Bank Board by appointing two 
members of his choosing to the Bank Board.  Eventually, in a cynical 
deal with then-Speaker of the House Jim Wright (who was shilling for 
Texas control frauds), the administration promised that Gray would not 
be reappointed in return for Wright’s support for a bill.  I use Gray’s 
experience to challenge the regulatory capture and public choice 
explanations for bureaucratic behavior and to explain why public choice 
theory is inadequate even to explain the intervention by politicians. 
Keating led the effort to block Gray’s reregulation.  His principal 
weapon against Gray was the work of his economists, including Alan 
Greenspan.  Keating used Greenspan to help recruit the five U.S. 
Senators who became known as the “Keating Five” after they pressured 
Gray to go easy on Keating’s S&L’s massive violation of a Bank Board 
rule.  No prominent economist supported reregulation, even though it 
proved crucial to containing the debacle and saved the taxpayers hundreds 
of billions of dollars. 
 
 33. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK 
AND THRIFT REGULATION 90 (1991). 
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After the debacle, the conventional economic wisdom became that the 
debacle was utterly predictable under economic theory.  It was all a 
matter of moral hazard.  Moral hazard notes that perverse incentives are 
created when gains and losses are asymmetrical.  If, for example, I am 
permitted to insure my commercial building and its contents in excess of 
market value, and if my policy has no deductible, I will gain from a fire 
while my insurance company will lose.  I have an incentive to either 
burn the building down (fraud) or avoid taking any steps that would 
reduce fire danger if they imposed any cost on me (excessive risk). 
Economists, with the exception of Akerlof and Romer and James 
Pierce,34 have decreed that control fraud was trivial during the debacle 
and that it should not be studied because it “distracts”35 from 
determining proper public policies.  I teach students that this is curious 
on three levels.  First, moral hazard theory predicts fraud as well as 
excessive risk taking and provides no basis for assuming that either one 
will be more common.36  Second, there were over one thousand felony 
convictions of S&L insiders, and convicting powerful white-collar defendants 
is extremely difficult and incredibly resource-intensive.  Fraud was 
“invariably present” at the worst failures.37  Control fraud was clearly 
one of the largest contributors, perhaps the largest, to the debacle, so its 
study should not be distracting.  The number of S&L insider convictions 
would have been considerably greater with adequate law enforcement 
resources and priorities; Attorney General Meese, for example, transferred a 
substantial number of white-collar financial prosecutors and FBI agents 
to pursue pornographers.38  Third, the failures that economists assume to 
be due to excessive risk followed policies that are wholly irrational if 
they were honest “gamblers for resurrection,” but wholly rational if they 
were control frauds.39  Economists, in this instance, ignore the internal 
inconsistency of their “rational actor” assumption. 
 
 34. See George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld 
of Bankruptcy for Profit, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1, 23–36 (1993) (arguing that the S&L scandal was caused in large part by fraud and “looting”).  James Pierce was the Executive Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement and authored its report on the causes of the debacle.  
See NAT’L COMM’N ON FIN. INST. REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 101 (1993) [hereinafter S&L DEBACLE].  35. WHITE, supra note 33, at 117. 
 36. Id. at 40–41.  37. S&L DEBACLE, supra note 34, at 4.  38. KITTY CALAVITA ET AL., BIG MONEY CRIME: FRAUD AND POLITICS IN THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS 143–68 (1997) (examining prosecution rates for S&L fraud suspects).  39. William K. Black et al., The Savings and Loan Debacle of the 1980s: White-
Collar Crime or Risky Business?, 17 LAW & POL’Y 23, 42–48 (1995) (arguing that the S&L crisis was caused by material fraud rather than by excessive risk taking or incompetence). 
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The moral hazard model is particularly interesting because it employs 
a rational actor assumption but then recognizes that the results as to 
any particular actor are indeterminate because moral restraints may 
prevent the actor from maximizing her financial self-interest.40  Similarly, 
neoclassical microeconomic models about crime often have embedded in 
them a term that corresponds to moral restraints.  This is yet another 
example of economists finding that predictive strength improves when 
more accurate assumptions are made.  Economic models that do not 
incorporate moral and social constraints greatly overpredict crime and 
traffic incivility (and underpredict tipping, voting, and courtesy to 
strangers). 
B.  Corporate Governance and Law and Economics 
As bad as these errors about the S&L debacle were, they pale next 
to the failure to learn the lessons of the debacle for corporate 
governance.  I use Professor Fischel’s law and economics approach to 
corporate governance to demonstrate to my students the importance of 
socioeconomics for an understanding of corporate governance, control 
fraud, and regulation.  Professor Fischel’s theories serve as a bridge 
between the S&L debacle and the more general topics of corporate 
governance, fraud, and regulation.  He was in a unique position to learn 
the lessons of the S&L debacle.  He was already a leading law and 
economics scholar during the debacle and had, with Judge Easterbrook, 
revolutionized the field by overturning the Berle and Means paradigm 
emphasizing the separation of ownership from control in large corporations. 
The Easterbrook and Fischel paradigm is radically different.41  It holds 
 
 40. Economists writing about the debacle have tended to remove the “moral” aspect of moral hazard.  A large part of the problem is the recasting of the moral hazard theory into option theory.  The controlling owner of an insolvent S&L with deposit insurance, for example, can be conceived of as having a “put” option.  If the fraud or gamble produces new losses instead of the firm’s “resurrection,” the combination of limited liability and deposit insurance means that the CEO or owner can “put” the losses to the taxpayers.  When conceived of as an option, however, the moral aspect disappears and economists assume that the issue is the normal question of maximizing the value of the option.  It follows that someone who acts abusively displays “cleverness,” see EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: HOW DID IT HAPPEN? 6 (1989), while someone who fails to engage in perverse behavior in response to moral hazard is no longer “moral.”  He is, instead, “stupid,”  “irrational,” or both.  See MARTIN LOWY, HIGH ROLLERS: INSIDE THE SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 54 (1991). 
 41. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
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that corporations are guided by an “invisible hand” to act in the interest 
of shareholders.42  The invisible hand is virtually inerrant; it has produced 
governance structures that are “optimal for society.”43  This view, in 
turn, was premised in large part on the assumption that financial markets 
are highly efficient. 
Professor Fischel had the opportunity to apply his new theory during 
the S&L debacle.  He was a leading consultant to Charles Keating of 
Lincoln Savings, Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert, and 
David Paul of CenTrust Savings.  Fischel used his theories to predict the 
risk of failure of Lincoln Savings and CenTrust.  These calculations 
were presented as accurate to the ten-thousandth place.44  He concluded 
that both S&Ls were highly profitable, financially strong, well-run, and 
posed no meaningful risk of failure.  He also concluded that their junk 
bond portfolios were particularly strong.45 
Keating, Milken, and Paul are all convicted felons, and Lincoln Savings, 
CenTrust, and Drexel are all failed firms.  The two S&L failures cost the 
taxpayers roughly $5 billion. 
After these predictive failures, Easterbrook and Fischel published The 
Economic Structure of Corporate Law in 1991.46  The book is the 
definitive law and economics work on corporate governance.  It does not 
mention Fischel’s failed efforts to use the theory to predict results.  It 
does not mention the S&L debacle. 
 The book has the following policy prescriptions that helped leave us 
so vulnerable to the current scandals: 
(1) Control fraud is not a serious problem because the markets 
find it easy to spot fraud.47 
(2) Honest firms differentiate themselves from fraudulent firms 
through three devices: 
(a)   by hiring a top tier audit firm;48 
(b)  by having their CEOs invest substantial portions of their 
assets in the company;49 
 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. Id. at 7. 
 44. See William Black, Reexamining the Law-and-Economics Theory of Corporate 
Governance, CHALLENGE, Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 22, 30.  45. Fischel was retained by Keating and Paul because of his work for Drexel.  Both S&Ls were Drexel “captives.”  They found out at the end of the day in a telex from Drexel what junk bonds they now owned.  Drexel used this absolute control over the portfolios to churn the accounts and dump its junkiest junk on the captives.  46. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 41.  47. Id. at 21, 116. 
 48. Id. at 280–83. 
 49. Id. at 282. 
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(c)   by being highly leveraged.50 
(3) Legal prohibitions against fraud are neither essential nor 
particularly important.51   
(4) White-collar fraud is a “one off” proposition that cannot be 
repeated.52   
(5) Regulation is at best ineffective and is likely to cause harm. 
(6) Regulators will perform far worse than the market.53 
(7) Stock analysts provide reliable advice.54 
(8) The ideal form of management is the controlling shareholder 
or CEO.55 
(9) The best board of directors shares the preferences of the 
CEO.56 
(10) Fiduciary duties of officers and directors are interpreted too 
stringently.57 
(11) Restraints on conflicts of interest are excessive.58 
 
At this juncture, this policy advice requires only explanation to my 
students, not refutation.  The advice has proved to be the worst possible.  
The advice is wrong because of predictive failures.  Those failures come 
from a lack of understanding of behavioral and institutional economics 
and criminology.  The worst errors flow from two predictions of 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s model.  They are that it is easy for legitimate 
firms to distinguish themselves from control frauds and that managers 
whose rewards depend on the company’s profitability will act to maximize 
shareholder value. 
I explain to students why criminology offers superior explanations of 
the scope and nature of major corporate frauds and why most treatments 
of “governance” are irrelevant when the CEO is the lead criminal.  The 
law and economics scholars have failed to understand that not only are 
control frauds able to camouflage themselves by emulating the three 
means of “differentiation,” but that the three means assist such frauds.  
 
 50. Id. at 114, 175–77, 282. 
 51. Id. at 283. 
 52. Id. at 103. 
 53. Id. at 20, 31, 303. 
 54. Id. at 18, 31. 
 55. Id. at 133. 
 56. Id. at 70, 73. 
 57. Id. at 107. 
 58. Id. at 115, 140–42. 
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Easterbrook and Fischel assert that a top audit firm will not provide a 
clean audit opinion to a control fraud because the gain from taking on a 
fraudulent client is far smaller than the loss in the value of the auditor’s 
reputation.  But the S&L debacle had just shown that hundreds of 
control frauds were able to get clean audit opinions, and that they 
invariably got them from “Big 8” firms.  As Keating said, his accountants 
made him money.  A prestigious outside auditor is the greatest ally of 
control frauds. 
Having the CEO own stock in the company also aids control fraud.  
Control frauds function by creating fictional profits through fraudulent 
accounting practices.  This inflates the value of the CEO’s stock and 
provides a seemingly legitimate means (along with dividends and stock 
bonuses) of converting company assets to the CEO’s ownership.  
Easterbrook and Fischel assert that if the CEO owns stock, the CEO 
cannot benefit unless the company does.  That was not true during the 
S&L debacle, as Fischel knew when he wrote the book, and it is not true 
now. 
Easterbrook and Fischel claim that only honest companies are highly 
leveraged because the high interest expenses permit only two choices: 
the company must be profitable so that it can pay, or it is forced into 
bankruptcy.  Again, Fischel knew from the S&L debacle that there was a 
third choice for control frauds.  Control frauds grow.  They are typically 
ponzi schemes.  The high “profits” generated by accounting fraud make 
it possible to grow by borrowing additional money (or selling more 
stock).  To a control fraud, leverage is simply an opportunity to defraud 
creditors in addition to shareholders. 
I have explained how the CEO’s stock ownership in the company can 
provide a means of converting firm assets to personal use.  Easterbrook 
and Fischel assume that the stock ownership will align the CEO’s interests 
with those of the shareholders.  This assumption is wrong whenever the 
company is weak.  Agency cost theory posits that the CEO should have 
superior information about the true condition of the firm.  If the CEO 
knows that the firm has poor long-term prospects, his financial interests 
are antagonistic to shareholders’ interests.  The CEO determines how the 
stock options will be structured.  Unsurprisingly, they are almost always 
structured to reward short-term results.  The CEO can easily manipulate 
short-term results.  Stock ownership by the CEO misaligns his interests 
with the shareholders when the company is troubled. 
The S&L debacle and the ongoing financial scandals are only two 
examples of how unsophisticated misuse of the neoclassical microeconomic 
model is bad economics and can lead to harmful policies.  Other  
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participants in this session with diverse backgrounds are presenting their 
own examples.  The S&L debacle, the ongoing financial scandals in the 
United States, and the twin bubbles in Japan do allow limited generalization.  
There are many competing statements of the efficient markets hypothesis.  
Some of them are far more limited in their claims of efficiency.  These 
three events, however, challenge even the weakest formulation.  The broadest 
financial markets can move away from efficiency for years, and the 
extent of their departure can reach trillions of dollars. 
III.  CAN WE DO BETTER? 
Critique is valuable.  Knowing that the efficient markets hypothesis can 
fail badly is important.  Warning students about the predictive failures of 
neoclassical economics and modern finance warrants teaching socioeconomics.  
But socioeconomics can be far more useful, and it can be more persuasive 
in the classroom, if it can provide a model with improved predictive 
power.  Improved predictive power is important because it can lead to 
better policy advice.  For example, efficient markets are desirable.  If we 
could predict what institutional changes would improve their efficiency, 
we could give better policy advice and teach students something that 
would be quite useful in practice. 
One of the reasons that fraud is bad is that it moves prices away from 
efficient outcomes.  Control fraud has far more potential to inflict this 
harm because the CEO can use the entire resources of the firm to sustain 
the fraud.  He can derail all the normal external and internal controls and 
turn them into contributors to the fraud.  He can move the operations of 
the firm into areas with the most abusive accounting practices.  He can 
cause the firm to grow massively.  The result is that massively insolvent 
companies have been able to present themselves as financial juggernauts.  
This causes extreme inefficiency. 
But control fraud does far more damage than inefficiency.  It cheats 
people and it erodes trust.  When control fraud becomes common, trust 
is crippled.  We are now beginning to understand how critical trust is to 
society.  In financial terms, a loss of trust translates into an increase in 
risk.  This rise in risk is gratuitous from society’s standpoint.  It acts as a 
deadweight drag on prosperity by increasing the cost of raising capital.  
In human terms, it can impair cooperation and spread cynicism. 
CEOs also set the tone for the organization.  Control frauds select the 
top managers.  The standard rule in a control fraud is to pick “yes” men 
and women without strong moral restraints in the business realm.  
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Corrupt CEOs create corrupt organizations.  Indeed, one of the perils of 
control fraud is that the “help” often steal from the organization.  The 
government claims that Mr. Fastow did so at Enron.  Keating’s director 
of regulatory compliance (which meant he was in charge of the opposite) 
embezzled money from Lincoln Savings and his church. 
The ongoing wave of control fraud has caused a major loss of trust 
and efficiency and cheated scores of millions of people.  My research 
goal is to help specify the institutional characteristics that produce waves 
of control fraud, propose institutional changes that discourage nonsystemic 
control frauds, and develop better means of detecting and stopping 
control frauds before they cause catastrophic losses.  My research, of 
course, informs my teaching.  I emphasize to my students that they can 
tackle these issues only with the robust, real world understandings that 
socioeconomics provides.  How can you orient your research agenda to 
best improve the quality of the economics taught to law students? 
 
